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Abstract—Large, strategic “Flagship” missions have unique 
characteristics that lead to challenging developmental 
difficulties for the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). Missions such as the Hubble Space 
Telescope (HST), James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), and 
the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) had technical and 
programmatic challenges that led to significant schedule delays 
and subsequent cost growth. Although NASA has instituted 
policies that have reduced cost growth for more “typical” NASA 
science missions, NASA Flagship missions remain a distinct 
challenge due to their requirement to provide unprecedented 
science or tackle bold exploration goals, typically while 
concurrently developing new technologies. The unique 
challenges presented by Flagship missions make it extremely 
difficult to fully predict cost and schedule given that the 
technical and programmatic advances needed to meet 
performance requirements are unprecedented. This paper 
addresses why Flagship missions are unique and proposes a new 
programmatic approach to develop and fund Flagship missions. 
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1. DEFINITION OF FLAGSHIP MISSIONS 
According to Miriam-Webster’s Dictionary, a Flagship is:   
1) the ship that carries the commander of a fleet or 
subdivision of a fleet and flies the commander's flag, or 2) the 
finest, largest, or most important one of a group of things. [1]  
In many ways, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) Flagship missions incorporate both  
 
of these definitions as they are the most visible because of 
their potential for scientific discovery and expense and are 
also the finest, largest, and most important of NASA’s 
science missions. NASA Flagship missions are 
unprecedented in the science that they enable as they provide 
exquisite measurements that cannot be done otherwise and 
typically require new technology or advanced engineering 
developments to acquire the measurements. 
Figure 1 shows typical examples of NASA Flagship missions 
such as Viking, Galileo, the Hubble Space Telescope (HST), 
and others relative to their launch date and development cost. 
As shown in Figure 1, Flagship mission are typically 
developed on the order of every 10 years and have a cost 
greater than $2B fiscal year 2017. The development cost is 
from the start of preliminary development at the beginning of 
Phase B through launch and is taken from NASA historical 
public budget documents and then inflated to fiscal year 2017 
equivalent dollars (FY17$). [2, 3] The relatively high cost of 
Flagship missions is due to their significant complexity with 
examples such as HST, as it was the largest pointable space 
telescope of its time, and the James Webb Space Telescope 
(JWST), which is larger than HST and operates at 
significantly colder temperatures while still meeting 
unprecedented stability requirements. 
 
Figure 1. NASA Flagship Mission Cost vs. Launch Date 
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2. BENEFITS OF FLAGSHIP MISSIONS  
The benefits of Flagship missions are substantial. In 2017, the 
National Academies of Sciences assembled a panel to assess 
NASA large, strategic science missions. The following lists 
examples of the benefits identified by the panel for NASA’s 
large, strategic missions: [4]   
 “Capture science data that cannot be obtained in any 
other way, owing usually to the physics of the data 
capture driving the scale and complexity of the mission 
 Answer many of the most compelling scientific 
questions facing the scientific fields supported by 
NASA’s Science Mission Directorate, and most 
importantly, develop and deepen humanity’s 
understanding of the Earth, our Solar System, and the 
universe 
 Open new windows of scientific inquiry, expanding the 
discovery space of humanity’s exploration of our own 
planet and the universe, and providing new technology 
and engineering approaches that can benefit future 
small, medium-size, and large missions 
 Provide high-quality (precise and with stable absolute 
calibration) observations sustained over an extended 
period of time 
 Support the workforce, the industrial base, and 
technology development 
 Maintain U.S. leadership in space 
 Maintain U.S. scientific leadership 
 Produce scientific results and discoveries that capture 
the public’s imagination and encourage young 
scientists and engineers to pursue science and technical 
careers 
 Receive a high degree of external visibility, often 
symbolically representing NASA’s science program as 
a whole 
 Provide greater opportunities for international 
participation, cooperation, and collaboration as well as 
opportunities for deeper interdisciplinary investigations 
across NASA science areas.” 
In addition, the sheer number of scientific papers from 
Flagship missions is astounding. Figure 2 shows the number 
of scientific papers published from the data collected from 
HST. [5] As can be seen, the total number of papers exceeds 
16,000 since HST’s launch in 1990 with an average of over 
800 papers over the last 5 years. 
 
 Figure 2. HST Publication Rates5 
Further, technology developed for Flagship missions also 
have been transferred to commercial usages. For example, 
charge coupled device (CCD) development undertaken for an 
HST instrument was later incorporated in a stereotactic breast 
biopsy machine, which detects tumor positions accurately 
enough to steer the biopsy probe, thereby reducing the need 
for surgery and cutting costs by 75 percent. [6] Additionally, 
new improvements in wavefront sensing technology 
developed for JWST have led to the development of the 
Shack-Hartmann Sensor which has enabled eye doctors to get 
much more detailed information about the shape of your eye 
in seconds rather than hours. [7] 
 
3. DIFFICULTY IN ESTIMATING FLAGSHIPS 
Flagship missions, due to their significant complexity and 
unprecedented nature of their science, are inherently difficult 
to estimate. NASA mission costs are typically estimated 
given cost model or analogy cost based on historical cost and 
technical data. [8] Given that Flagship missions are first of a 
kind, there are no comparable costs to use as an estimate and, 
more importantly, all aspects of the mission that need to be 
done. Design trades and options are numerous and 
indeterminate through the development phase such that 
establishing a robust, stable technical baseline prior to the 
start of development, and therefore developing a robust, 
stable cost estimate, is extremely challenging.  
A good example of this challenge is the school bus sized HST 
which was, at the time, the largest space telescope ever 
developed. It required the development of a lightweight,  
2.4-meter mirror and several extremely complex scientific 
instruments. HST also was designed to be serviceable in-
space by astronauts, something that had never been done, to 
replace spacecraft components and science instruments to be 
able to survive for its baseline 17-year mission life. Figure 3 
shows a plot of the cost estimate and cumulative cost of HST 
during its development. The initial estimate was about one-
third for the final actual cost of HST, demonstrating the 
difficulty of estimating an unprecedented, Flagship mission. 
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Figure 3. HST Cost Estimates vs. Actual Cost 
The National Academies of Sciences identified the difficulty 
in assessing Flagship missions in Decadal Survey studies and 
developed the Cost and Technical Evaluation (CATE) 
process, in conjunction with The Aerospace Corporation, in 
an effort to estimate large, strategic missions given the best 
available knowledge. [9] The CATE process includes 
elements to anticipate cost growth such as design growth 
threats, launch vehicle threats and schedule threat in order to 
anticipate how the technical and programmatic baseline may 
evolve over time. The CATE process was implemented in the 
2010 Astrophysics Decadal Survey as a result of the 
significant underestimation of several missions in the 2001 
Astrophysics Decadal Survey. 
 
4. FLAGSHIP COST GROWTH  
Large projects are difficult, regardless of how much many 
times something similar has been undertaken. A recent study 
looked at over 60 different construction projects in the 
mining, infrastructure, and oil and gas industries. The study 
determined that the average cost overrun was 80% and the 
projects were delivered 2 years later than promised. [10]   
In the transportation sector, “Megaprojects” is the term used 
to discuss the type of projects that has some key defining 
factors: funding requirements are large (on the order of 
hundreds of millions or billions of dollars); human resource 
demands are commensurately large; the projects have high 
complexity, with technology development requirements; and 
such projects have the potential to greatly impact their 
environment. [11] The “Big Dig,” which was a construction 
project to develop a tunnel under the Boston metropolitan 
area, ended up costing $14.6 billion relative to the original 
project cost estimate of $2.6 billion and was originally 
scheduled to take 4 years vs. 10 years it took to  
complete. [12]  Although the United States Navy has been 
building aircraft carriers since prior to World War II, the 
latest Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier, a literal Flagship 
commissioned in 2015, cost $13B and took 10 years to 
develop, which was 3 years behind schedule and $2.4B over 
its initial cost. [13] 
A more complex project that is representative of the 
unprecedented nature of a NASA Flagship mission is the 
Large Hadron Collider (LHC), which was developed to find 
the Higgs boson constant. The initial cost of the LHC plus 
experiments was supposed to be on the order of 2.8B Swiss 
francs and ended up being around 5.8B. It was supposed to 
be built in 7 years and took 10 years to finish, as well as 
needing another year to become operational after a magnet 
quench incident. [14] Similarly, the U.S. version of the LHC, 
the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC), was originally 
supposed to cost $4.4B and was estimated to be $11B when 
it was cancelled after 6 years of development and over  
$2B spent. [15] 
A study that was conducted in 2013 identified that Flagship 
missions stand out from other NASA missions in terms of 
complexity and visibility. The Flagship Assessment team 
identified several common issues affecting major mission 
performance: [16] 
 “A low cost and schedule estimate, sometimes referred 
to as buy-in, submitted by a Program or project based 
on a number of beliefs, including optimism that the new 
mission can be done better (i.e., faster, cheaper) than 
previous missions, the notion that new techniques will 
improve cost and schedule performance, the desire on 
the part of those external to NASA for the Agency to 
find ways to do more work at a lower cost, experience 
that says changes will happen regardless of the 
robustness of the project’s plan, or a desire to win a 
competitive bid for the next new mission; 
 Inadequate funding for concept studies, concept, and 
technology development; 
 Changes in requirements, funding profiles, workforce, 
and partner contributions throughout development, 
even after the Agency has committed to mission 
content, cost, and schedule; 
 Technical challenges, mission complexity, or the 
number of new technologies needed for the mission to 
succeed; 
 Disconnects with the external budget environment or 
changes in the political environment; and 
 Differences between Agency and stakeholder priorities 
where NASA prioritizes mission success and other 
stakeholders set delivering a mission on cost and 
schedule as an equal priority.” 
Case Studies Overview 
To illustrate the challenge with developing NASA Flagship 
missions, a series of case studies was investigated. These 
included the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL), the Space 
Interferometry Mission (SIM) and the James Webb Space 
Telescope (JWST). 
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Case Study – Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) 
NASA’s MSL mission was responsible for landing the largest 
Mars rover ever developed, Curiosity, which was the size of 
a small car. Its major objective was to find evidence of a past 
environment that could support microbial life. Curiosity 
carried the most advanced payload of scientific instruments 
ever used on Mars’ surface with a payload more than  
10 times heavier than earlier Mars rovers. More than  
400 scientists from around the world participate in the science 
operations. [17]   
To illustrate the relative size of the MSL rover, Figure 4 
shows the comparison of Curiosity at 900 kg to previous 
NASA Mars landers and rovers including the Mars 
Exploration Rover (MER) at 174 kg, the Phoenix lander  
at 410 kg, and the Mars Pathfinder Sojourner rover at  
11.5 kg. [18]  MSL also required several critical technologies 
to be developed including: Entry, Descent, and Landing 
System, Mars Lander Engine, Long-Life, Extreme 
Environment Actuators, Sample Acquisition/Sample 
Processing and Handling System, Advanced Rover 
Technologies, Mobility Technologies, and Integrated 
Simulation Tools. [19] 
 
Figure 4. MSL, MER, Phoenix, Pathfinder 
Comparison18 
The initial development schedule for MSL was aggressive 
given the unique first-of-a-kind capabilities that needed to be 
developed such as the Sky Crane, propulsive lander 
development, the sample acquisition, processing and 
handling systems, as well as the complex Sample Analysis at 
Mars (SAM) instrument which conducted the primary 
surface sample analysis. As the project progressed, it became 
evident that MSL could not develop the components required 
and successfully integrate and test the complete system prior 
to the original 2009 launch date. It was decided in December 
2008 that the launch date should be moved to the next 
available launch date in 2011. [20] 
MSL was chosen as part the 2003 National Academy of 
Sciences Planetary Decadal Survey estimate was estimated to 
be a “medium” class mission, which was defined as being less 
than $650M. [21] This characterization as a medium mission 
was problematic given that MSL requirements were not fully 
determined and there was not a design of MSL at the time of 
the Decadal Survey. The baseline cost for MSL set after the 
Preliminary Design Review (PDR) in August 2006 was 
$1.6B. [22] Due to the assumptions of the initial aggressive 
schedule, the required technology developments, and the 
subsequent 26-month delay for the next available launch 
period, the additional effort required resulted in a final cost 
for MSL of $2.5B. [23] Lessons learned from MSL, and a 
substantial amount of design heritage, are being incorporated 
into the next Mars rover mission, Mars 2020, which conducts 
Mars surface sample analysis and will collect samples for a 
future Mars Sample Return mission which has been a priority 
in previous decadal surveys. [24] 
Case Study – Space Interferometry Mission (SIM) 
SIM’s science goals were primarily in the area of ultra-
precise astrometry, the measurement of the minute motion of 
stars, and other astronomical sources. The goal was to 
provide a two orders of magnitude improvement in 
astrometric precision relative to the European Space 
Association Hipparcos mission. [25] Figure 5 illustrates the 
astrometric precision required by SIM as opposed to the 
Hipparcos and HST. [26] Technological challenges included 
nanometer-level control and stabilization of optical elements 
on a lightweight flexible structure, sub-nanometer-level 
sensing of optical element relative positions over meters of 
separation distance, and overall instrument complexity and 
the implications for interferometer integration and test and 
autonomous on-orbit operations. [27] 
 
Figure 5. SIM Capability Relative to Other Telescopes 
The 1991 Astrophysics Decadal Survey identified SIM, 
which was then known as the Astrometric Interferometry 
Mission (AIM), as a high priority mission which would use 
small telescopes in space separated by up to 100 meters to 
measure the positions of stars with 3-to 30-millionths of an 
arcsecond precision. It was considered a “moderate” mission 
at the cost of $250M. [28] SIM was also stated as high 
priority in the 2001 Astrophysics Decadal Survey as the 
committee reaffirmed the recommendations made regarding 
SIM in the previous Decadal Survey. In particular, the 
committee recognized that AIM had evolved to the more 
capable SIM mission, which would “enable the discovery of 
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planets much more similar to Earth in mass and orbit than 
those detectable now, and it should permit astronomers to 
survey the Milky Way Galaxy 1,000 times more accurately 
than is possible now.” [29]    
It was recognized, however, that the technology development 
required for SIM to be implemented should be fully 
developed prior to the start of system implementation. As 
such, a comprehensive technology development program was 
developed where eight specific technical milestones were 
identified before SIM could proceed to construction. By 
2006, all of the eight technology milestones had been 
demonstrated. [30] Additionally, the concept for SIM 
continued to evolve, starting with a 10-meter baseline 
interferometer in 2000, to a 9-meter baseline in 2006, to the 
final 6-meter baseline, now referred to as SIMLite, in 2009, 
in an effort to simplify the design to reduce cost.  
For the 2010 Astrophysics Decadal Survey, SIMLite was one 
of the many concepts evaluated. At this point, the National 
Academy of Sciences CATE process was in place and 
estimated the total cost of SIMLite to be $1.9B from October 
2010 onward. Although SIMLite was technically mature and 
would provide a substantial, important new capability in 
interferometry, it was not included in the recommended 
program for the decade, following the committee’s 
consideration of “the strengths of competing compelling 
scientific opportunities and the highly constrained budget 
scenarios described in this report.” [31] 
SIM experience showed that the process worked, i.e., that 
technology development was required before mission 
development began, and that design evolution could occur to 
satisfy both science advancements and budgetary constraints 
before, unfortunately, other missions took priority over SIM. 
Although almost $610M were spent on SIM technology 
development from 1999 to 2008, this funding was not wasted. 
[32] The money spent on technology development, however, 
was useful to reduce the risk and increase the robustness  
of the technical baseline for future missions, such as the 
Habitable Exoplanet (HabEx) Observatory mission,  
which will be submitted to the upcoming Astrophysics 
Decadal Survey. [33] 
Case Study – James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) 
JWST was initially identified as the Next Generation Space 
Telescope (NGST) as a follow-on to HST. JWST is the most 
complex space-based observatory ever developed requiring 
significant technology development to operate at cryogenic 
temperatures to take the measurement needed to meet its 
science requirements. JWST has a 6.5-meter aperture 
consisting of 18x1.32-meter beryllium mirrors which are 
unfolded to be able to fit within a launch vehicle’s fairing and 
are controlled individually to fine-tune the telescopes overall 
performance. Figure 6 illustrates the size of the fully 
deployed JWST mirrors vs. that of HST’s monolithic  
2.4-meter mirror. [34] As noted previously, HST was the size 
of a school bus, while JWST, when fully deployed, is the size 
of a tennis court. 
 
Figure 6. Relative Size of JWST Mirror to HST34 
NGST was initiated during the “faster, better, cheaper” era in 
the mid-1990s by then NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin. 
Goldin challenged NASA to build an HST follow-on that was 
larger and cheaper than HST. This challenge included 
operating the 8-meter telescope at 40 degrees above absolute 
zero (40 Kelvin), while requiring both the telescope and a 
super-thin, lightweight thermal sunshield to be folded to fit 
within available launch vehicle fairings. [35] 
Prior to the 2001 Astrophysics Decadal Survey, a study was 
conducted in 1997 to assess the feasibility of an 8-meter 
NGST. NASA and its industry and academic partners studied 
three approaches which included a TRW deployable 8-meter 
segmented primary mirror telescope and erectable sunshield 
deployed at Lagrange point L2 orbit, a Lockheed Martin 
monolithic 6-meter thin shell primary mirror telescope and 
fixed sunshade in an interplanetary orbit beyond that of Mars, 
and a Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) developed 
deployable 8-meter segmented primary mirror telescope and 
inflatable sunshield, also deployed at L2. [36] 
All three teams determined that NASA could launch NGST 
by 2005 and confirmed, because of advanced technology and 
the requirement that the observatory have one-fourth the 
mass of HST, the Agency would be able to build NGST for 
significantly less than the $2 billion (1990 dollars) it had 
invested in HST. Each of the studies assumed, however, that 
NASA would receive at least $175 million (1996 dollars) for 
mission definition and technology development and another 
$500 million for construction. The estimates for each of  
the concepts, each of which is below $600M, is shown in 
Figure 7, for the three telescopes studies as well an alternative 
Lockheed-Martin 6-meter monolithic telescope. [36] 
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Figure 7. Comparison of Initial Estimates for NGST 
The NGST study team rationalized that the cost of NGST 
could be lower than HST believing that HST was more 
complex since NGST was not serviceable, was much lighter 
and had reduced pointing requirements, would only be 
operated in near infrared, had innovative new computer-aided 
design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM) tools to reduce the 
cost of design, and was based on ground-based segmented 
telescopes so the primary segmented-mirror technology was 
already proven. A full list of this comparison is shown in 
Table 1 as taken from the NGST study report. [36] 
Table 1. Comparison of HST to NGST from 1997 Study 
 
It was quickly realized that the initial estimate was 
underestimated such that the 2001 Astrophysics Decadal 
Survey provided an estimate of $1.2B, in FY 2000 dollars, 
for the development of the NGST. [37]  By January 2003, 
after the selection of the primary contractor, the cost of the 
now-named JWST, 7-meter aperture telescope mission 
would be on the order of $1.6B in FY 2002 dollars. [38]  
The estimated cost of JWST increased to $3.5B by 2004 and 
$4.5B by 2006 and had evolved to its current design of a 6.5-
meter telescope. [39] 
Knowing that JWST needed to develop 10 technologies to be 
able to develop the system, the JWST project took the 
unusual step of having a Technology Non-Advocate Review 
(TNAR) to confirm that technology was mature. The TNAR 
consisted of non-advocate industry experts to review each of 
the 10 technologies to ensure that they reached Technology 
Readiness Level (TRL) 6 one-year prior to the JWST PDR. 
Specifically, the 10 technologies that needed to be developed 
included: [40] 
1. Near Infrared (NIR) Detectors  
2. Sidecar ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit) 
3. Mid Infrared (MIR) Detectors  
4. MIRI Cryocooler 
5. Microshutters 
6. Heat Switch 
7. Sunshield Membrane 
8. Wavefront Sensing & Control (WFS&C) 
9. Primary Mirror 
10. Cryogenic Stable Structures 
At the time of PDR in 2008, the cost of JWST was $4.5B and 
all technologies were TRL 6 or above. The funding profile, 
however, did support the continued development of JWST. 
Historically peak funding for a project occurs after the 
Critical Design Review (CDR) as the design is being 
finalized and components are being delivered. As shown in 
Figure 8, the JWST funding profile peaked at PDR and then 
decreased significantly during the CDR and integration and 
test (I&T) phase. [41] As can be seen, spacecraft 
development had yet to begin while sunshade development 
and the full I&T of the most complex spacecraft system that 
has ever been developed, was still ahead. The funding profile 
resulted in work being deferred to the future given that  
annual funding constraints required immediate problems to 
be resolved. 
 
Figure 8. JWST Funding Profile as of May 2006 
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After JWST passed its CDR in 2010, there was a growing 
concern that deferred work would cause the launch schedule 
to slip and the cost of JWST to increase. The Independent 
Comprehensive Review Panel (ICRP) was formed and 
recommended that the earliest possible launch date was in 
late 2015 and that the development cost of JWST should be 
between $6.2B and $6.8B. [42]   
As an exercise to understand the impact of the funding profile 
on the potential cost of JWST, The Aerospace Corporation 
ran an analysis that estimated an “ideal” funding profile vs. 
the actual funding profile made available to JWST based on 
historical funding profiles. [43] Figure 9 shows the results of 
the analysis and shows the significant decrease in funding 
after PDR that JWST experienced compared to the ideal 
funding profile that increases through CDR and into the first 
part of I&T. Based on other analysis conducted, the penalty 
associated with this reduced funding profile during time of 
need is on the order of $1B. [44] 
 
Figure 9. Comparison of Actual vs. Ideal  
Funding Profile 
JWST, when launched, will be the most complex system ever 
sent into space and will provide new discoveries for the next 
decade. Further, the success of JWST will pave the way for 
next generation space telescopes such as the Large 
UV/Optical/IR Surveyor (LUVOIR) [45] and the Origins 
Space Telescope (OST). [46]  
 
5. COULD COSTS HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATED? 
The unique challenges presented by Flagship missions make 
it extremely difficult to fully predict cost and schedule  
given that the technical advances needed to meet 
performance requirements are unprecedented. Flagships are 
typically complex and demanding in terms of scale,  
teaming arrangements, priority, and novel technology.  
Often they involve technological advances or new 
applications of technologies, new processing, and unique 
manufacturing. [47]   Although the projects are planned to 
initial estimates, delays cause the cost to meet schedule to 
escalate, and therefore require more funding on an annual 
basis than was requested. Limiting the funding in the early 
years can cause further growth in later years while work is 
deferred and the schedule is stretched even more. This 
developmental difficulty is consistent with other government 
agencies as noted by the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
which has identified similar issues with Department of 
Energy (DoE) large-scale program implementation. [48]    
For the case studies identified in this paper, estimating the 
cost and schedule for these missions would have been 
extremely challenging. Due to the unprecedented nature of 
Flagship missions, there is no comparable cost to use as an 
analogous estimate. The development schedule for 
technology development is also uncertain, leading to a large 
uncertainty in the final launch schedule. In addition, early in 
their lifetime, the design of Flagships is not fully known so it 
is difficult to assess the cost of a “moving target” as the 
design evolves. The design trades and options are numerous 
and indeterminate through early concept development and 
preliminary designs as technologies mature. The final cost of 
Flagships missions really cannot be fully baselined until after 
the technology development is complete and the design has 
fully matured which is typically after CDR.  
 
6. A POTENTIAL NEW APPROACH 
A proposed approach to developing Flagship missions should 
help eliminate some of the historical issues in Flagship 
development. This approach would ensure that a 
programmatic baseline is established after both the 
technology and design have matured such that an accurate 
estimate could be developed. It has been shown that a policy 
that sets the programmatic baseline after a mature design had 
been developed, provides the ability to manage the program 
to cost. [49] 
The proposed process for developing future Flagship 
missions is shown in Figure 10 and consists of the following: 
 Step 1: Conduct a science assessment and concept 
feasibility study to determine the value of the science 
and define technology challenges. 
 Step 2: Fund technologies to TRL 6 with defined 
pass/fail gates for each technology where the phase is 
open ended with a consistent level of technology 
funding until technologies pass the required TRL gate. 
 Step 3: Begin an open-ended Phase B to mature the 
whole system concept to TRL 6 by PDR, include 
prototyping of manufacturing and test activities.  
 Step 4: Agree to a not-to-exceed annual funding level 
that continues until a prototype is complete (Step 6). 
 Step 5: After the technology development phase is 
complete, develop a prototype of the system to work out 
implementation issues to know the scope of work  
going forward. 
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Figure 10. Proposed Approach to Developing and Funding Flagship Missions 
 Step 6: As prototype development is nearing 
completion, provide a realistic estimate of the scope of 
work ahead using CDR as the gate for continuation.  
 Step 7: Get Congressional approval for all remaining 
development funds which is similar to working capital 
funds for the U.S. Navy for aircraft carrier procurement. 
 Step 8: Conduct Phase C/D as typical, holding the 
Systems Integration Review (SIR), Pre-Environmental 
Review (PER), Pre-Ship Review (PSR), etc., with 
lower level peer reviews as needed. 
Step 7 requires a unique approach where Congress approves 
the full funding for the remaining cost of the Flagship mission 
once the technology development is complete, the concept is 
mature and a prototype is developed. This approach helps to 
avoid the restriction of annual funding changes during the 
final part of development and is analogous to the approach 
that the U.S. Navy acquires aircraft carriers in terms of no 
year funding. [50] No year funding provides for a one-time 
allocation of funding approved by Congress that can be used 
as needed over several fiscal years. Similar funding 
mechanisms are implemented by the U.S. Air Force, U.S. 
Army, and other agencies. [51] This approach is also 
consistent with GAO’s recommendation that DoE utilize a 
similar mechanism for its large-scale projects. [52] 
Consistent with GAO’s recommendations for DoE, a capital 
account or no year funding appropriation could lower the 
uncertainty of future funding inherent in the incremental 
funding process for future NASA large scale, strategic 
mission developments. Such a mechanism would also enable 
these missions to be more appropriately managed to the 
programmatic baseline total life cycle cost, and not be subject 
to variations in annual budgets. Per the Office of 
Management and Budget’s (OMB) Circular A-11, full 
funding means that appropriations are, “enacted that are 
sufficient in total to complete a useful segment of a capital 
project before any obligation may be incurred for that 
segment.” [53] This approach is not unprecedented in NASA 
as Congress authorized full funding for the Space Shuttle 
orbiter Endeavour (OV-105) in August 1987 as a replacement 
for the Space Shuttle orbiter Challenger. [54] 
The steps outlined should allow a mature system to be 
developed before a programmatic baseline is established, 
while fully funding the mission allows for maximum 
flexibility with limited interruptions due to annual  
funding constraints. 
To test this theory, the authors used The Aerospace 
Corporation developed Sand Chart Tool (SCT). SCT is a 
probabilistic simulation of budgets and costs that simulates a 
program’s strategic response to internal or external events 
that cause cost and schedule to grow and was developed to 
assess the effect of potential overruns on a portfolio of 
missions. [55] It includes a series of penalties, based on 
historical data, when projects need to be shifted, stretched, or 
have funding reprogrammed given restrictions in annual 
budgets. It has been used in several cases including the 
assessment of a new, instrument first, science mission 
acquisition approach and to assess the appropriate budgeting 
and funding confidence level for different types of program 
portfolios. [56, 57] SCT can also be run for a single mission 
to assess how these penalties can affect cost overruns due to 
standing army cost and the inefficiencies of schedule 
stretches due to a non-optimal profile.  
SCT was used for a fictitious Flagship mission to identify if 
the proposed different acquisition strategy could be more 
effective. For the analysis conducted, two cases were 
developed: Case #1, which represents the traditional 
acquisition approach, and Case #2, which represents the new 
Flagship acquisition approach identified above. Each case 
initiates a Flagship mission in the year 2020, with Case #1 
baselining a $4B FY20$ mission that will take 10 years to 
develop. Unfortunately, this estimate is premature, given all 
the unknowns in the requirements, design, and technology 
such that the baseline funding is underestimated. Figure 11 
shows the average of the simulation runs for the 1) original 
planned funding, 2) adjusted, unpenalized funding that would 
be needed if the budget was unconstrained, and 3) observed, 
penalized funding profile given the annual budget limit 
imposed by the project. 
Technology Development
Mature Concept
Prototype Development
Full Development 
Annual Funding Constrained
Indefinite Period defined by meeting criteria
Full Funding
Approved by Congress
CDRPDR
Concept 
Feasibility
Science 
Assessment
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Figure 11. Case #1 Traditional Funding Comparison 
Case #2, however, has a similar funding profile in the first  
2 years but levels off at a fixed annual funding level, as 
described in Step 4 above, until the first six steps are executed 
and the project faces a CDR after a prototype is built. Given 
that the there is a much greater understanding of the baseline 
and all technology development and manufacturing 
challenges have been addressed, the baseline estimate of $7B 
over 14 years is more mature, and there is less uncertainty in 
the estimate. In addition, the full funding approach allows for 
the funding to be provided in a timely fashion. Figure 12 
shows the results of the new approach and how the greater 
certainty in the estimate leads to fewer deviations from the 
plan and less cost and schedule growth due to inefficiencies 
imposed by annual funding constraints. 
 
Figure 12. Case #2 New Approach Funding Comparison 
Figure 13 shows a comparison of the average observed 
funding from the simulation between the traditional, Case #1 
funding and the new, Case #2 funding. Notice that the  
Case #2 funding hits an agreed upon plateau, approximately 
$400M per year, then remains at that level until a prototype 
is built. Case #1 shows that additional funding is spent, 
although not as productively, as the initially under-scoped 
activities are stretched to fit annual funding constraints. 
These penalties compound and are paid off over the life of 
the project resulting in a greater cost and a longer 
development schedule. 
 
Figure 13. Case #1 and #2 Observed Funding Comparison 
A comparison of the planned vs. average observed launch 
date and average total cost for each case provides additional 
insight. Tables 2 and 3 provide a summary of the planned vs. 
observed results for the two cases. Notice that the traditional 
Case #1 in Table 2 has significant overruns in both cost and 
schedule, which are consistent with a traditional, Flagship-
like acquisition, whereas the new, Case #2 approach shows a 
minimal delay and minimal cost overrun. In addition,  
the absolute cost of Case #2 is less, and the launch date is 
earlier, than the Case #1 traditional approach. The simulation 
results show that having a more robust estimate with less 
uncertainty obtained by maturing the design and building a 
prototype prior to making a full funding commitment can lead 
to a less costly mission with an earlier launch date than the 
traditional approach.   
Table 2. Planned vs. Observed Comparison for Case #1 
Case #1 
Traditional 
Original 
Planned 
Simulation 
Observed 
Launch Date March 2029 May 2035 
Cost (FY$20) $4.0B $9.5B 
 
Table 3. Planned vs. Observed Comparison for Case #2 
Case #2  
New Approach 
Original 
Planned 
Simulation 
Observed 
Launch Date March 2033 January 2034 
Cost (FY$20) $7.0B $7.7B 
 
The key to the new approach is to convince all stakeholders 
to approve funding upfront, $2B in the case of the example 
shown, for a mission that may be too expensive for the 
country to afford. This approach does, however, provide a 
mechanism for all stakeholders to consciously approve or 
cancel a mission based on a final cost that is much more 
known than has been traditionally. Although the cancellation 
risks may be high with this new approach, there is also benefit 
in terms of the more robust cost-benefit trade that can be 
conducted by industry, academia, OMB, Congress and the 
public given the cost certainty. What the project risks in 
cancellation, it gains later in advocacy when a firm, rationale 
decision is made based on the perceived value of the mission 
and its true cost and schedule. 
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7. SUMMARY 
NASA Flagship missions are unique in terms of their 
consistent attempt to push the boundaries of scientific 
discoveries by orders of magnitude above previous missions. 
As such, they provide substantial benefits to the science 
community as well as to the prestige of NASA. This 
challenge typically requires technology and engineering 
developments that are often first-of-a-kind such that 
predicting the cost and schedule of these missions is difficult. 
Because of these unique circumstances, the approach to 
developing NASA Flagship missions should be unique. The 
paper proposed a way in which annual funding is provided in 
the early stages of development, to cover feasibility studies, 
technology developments and prototype development, before 
fully funding the Flagship mission for the remaining 
development. The proposed approach should allow for a full 
assessment of the benefits of a given Flagship mission while 
having a firm grasp on the cost prior to fully committing to 
the mission. 
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ACRONYMS 
AIM Astrometric Interferometry Mission 
ASIC Application-Specific Integrated Circuit 
CAD/CAM Computer-Aided Design & Manufacturing 
CATE Cost and Technical Evaluation 
CCD Charge Coupled Device 
CDR Critical Design Review 
DoE Department of Energy 
FY Fiscal Year 
HabEx Habitable Exoplanet 
HST Hubble Space Telescope 
ICRP Independent Comprehensive Review Panel 
GAO General Accounting Office 
I&T Integration and Test 
JWST James Webb Space Telescope 
LHC Large Hadron Collider 
LUVOIR Large Ultraviolet/Optical/Infra-Red 
MER Mars Exploration Rover 
MIR Mid-Infrared 
MIRI Mid-Infrared Instrument 
MSL Mars Science Laboratory 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
NGST Next Generation Space Telescope 
NIR Near Infrared 
OMB Office of Management and Budget 
OST Origins Space Telescope 
PDR Preliminary Design Review 
PER Pre-Environmental Review 
PSR Pre-Ship Review 
RY Real Year 
SAM Sample Analysis Mars 
SCT Sand Chart Tool 
SIM Space Interferometry Mission 
SSC Superconducting Super Collider 
SIR System Integration Review 
TNAR Technology Non-Advocate Review 
TRL Technology Readiness Level 
WFS&C Wavefront Sensing & Control 
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